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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The knapsack problem is a classical problem in operation research (see Cabot, 1970): suppose
that a rational agent has a finite set of objects – each with a given weight and a given value
for her – and a rucksack with limited capacity (in weight), and she has to choose a selection
of objects in discrete quantities to put in the sack. In its unbounded version (see Andonov
et al., 2000), there are no restrictions on the number of copies of each kind of item that
can be put in the sack. The above decision problem can also be interpreted as a choice
over alternative time allocations: now the agent has a limited amount of time and several
activities that she can do in discrete amounts, and each activity takes some time to be
performed and gives a utility reward at its completion. The ensuing maximization problem
involves a single agent who has to compare a finite number of possible choices; nevertheless,
it is NP -complete, which roughly means that the number of operations required to find the
optimal solution grows exponentially in the number of possible objects (or activities). The
issue of time allocation by a single agent has recently been studied in Coviello et al. (2013).
From their perspective, an agent has to carry on many different activities over time, and the
resulting phenomenon of task juggling is investigated both theoretically and empirically.
However, in the real world, activities are often performed by people in teams, so that the
constraints each agent has to take into consideration in her decision depend on the choices,
and hence the constraints, of others. For instance, if Alice wants to allocate a couple of
hours on Saturday morning to playing tennis, but all her friends have already fully allocated
time on Saturday morning to other activities, then Alice’s desire to play tennis will remain
unsatisfied. This simple example shows the existence of indirect externalities that must
be taken into account in every individual decision when activities are performed in teams,
bringing an additional layer of difficulty in the knapsack problem presented above.
The following example is helpful to illustrate the generality of the setup that we want
to deal with. Consider the question of co-authorships in academic research. People work
simultaneously on different projects, and in order to do so they form teams of varying
numerosity, or remain separate from one another. Each researcher can participate in more
than one group, and every group can work on more than one project. Each project has a cost
in terms of time and an expected reward in terms of career opportunities, and both time
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and reward are allowed to be heterogeneous across each member in the team. Moreover,
every team that is formed may generate negative (or positive) direct externalities for non-
members, due for instance to the reduction of effort that a researcher puts into each single
project when she undertakes a new project.
Other applications where people are organized in teams to increase their production are
given by a growing number of internet platforms that in recent times have started matching
firms that post open problems with solvers (usually computer programmers) that apply
to solve them for a monetary reward. This is the case of platforms like GitHub (https:
//github.com/), where programmers, who are connected in a Facebook-like social network,
can self-organize in teams of any size and register to find a solution (this is the environment
empirically analyzed by Majumder et al., 2012, and modeled theoretically, but under a
different perspective from ours, by Fuchs and Garicano, 2012).
This team formation process can also be a representation for the production of new
patents, or in the entrepreneurial activity related to the co-foundation of firms (two aspects
surveyed, respectively, by Breschi and Lissoni, 2001 and by Stuart and Sorenson, 2008).
All the cases above are such that a social planner (or a research agency that wants to
promote scientific research in the example of co-authorships) is interested in maximizing the
number of successful teams. Consider an example of the latter kind of research agency; such
an agency may well assume as primary goal the maximization of the total number of research
papers that are published. Other information might well be relevant in principle, like journal
rankings, but this is often difficult to take into account (e.g., see the list of reviews in the
new Italian National Scientific Qualification, art. 16 of the law 30 December 2010, n. 240; it
contains a single and very large class of reviews that are regarded as qualified).
Finally, there are also Internet platforms not devoted to professional activities, but simply
to leisure, which allow consumers to match in groups in order to play together in sports games
(as http://www.fubles.com/ for Futsal1) or to engage in consumption activities that need
the coordination of a bunch of users, such as guided tourist tours (one of the services provided,
e.g., by http://www.groupon.com). These examples have no clear objective functions from
the point of view of a social planner, but in both cases there are platform organizers who
would surely like to maximize the number of successful teams or users matched together.
Therefore, maximization of the overall number of realized projects is in many setups, and for
1Futsal is indoor soccer played 5 vs. 5: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futsal.
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different reasons, a focal objective of either the social planner or some other administrator.
1.2 Outline
In our model we try to encompass all the possible applications discussed above, generalizing
matching models and network formation models. We imagine a finite set of agents, with
heterogeneous constraints on time, who have the possibility of choosing between a finite set
of teams. Not all teams are allowed to be formed. The description of which teams are allowed
to be formed is called technology. Every team can be feasible or unfeasible, depending on
many exogenous constraints that are summarized in the given technology. For instance,
agents may form a team only if they are neighbors in an exogenously given social network,
or if they match complementary exogenous skills, or if they have common communication
tools.
Teams of different size are allowed, unless explicitly assumed otherwise (as in marriage,
where only teams of size two can be formed). A configuration of feasible teams is itself said
to be feasible if time constraints are satisfied for each agent. A feasible configuration is called
a state, and each state provides a specific payoff to each agent. As we discuss in Section 2.4,
this setup generalizes matching models and network formation models.
What we find is that, under the assumption of non-satiation with respect to teams for
every agent, an extension of the simple notion of pair-wise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996) to this setup – which we call myopic team-wise stability – does not have a strong
predictive power on the stable states of the model; in particular, feasible states that are
maximal with respect to set inclusion are myopically team-wise stable. Therefore, we com-
pare two possible refinements. The first is given by stochastic stability : in the presence of
extremely rare errors that can create or dissolve teams, and with agents that adapt my-
opically to the current state of the system, we find that the stochastically stable states are
those that actually maximize the overall number of teams. The second is a generalization of
coalitional stability for cooperative games (Gillies, 1959): its predictive capability will turn
out to be heavily dependent on the assumptions on payoff functions. Moreover, when all
projects are equivalent for every agent in terms of costs (resources employed) and benefits
(payoffs earned), we find that the states that satisfy this form of coalitional stability are
exactly the same as those that are myopically team-wise stable. Therefore, this refinement
– which is much more demanding in terms of agents’ rationality – proves to have no greater
4
predictive power with respect to myopic team-wise stability in a stark but significant case.
1.3 Relation to the theoretical literature
As far as matching models are concerned, the most recent papers that study multi-matching
environments are Pycia (2012) and Hatfield et al. (2012), but their contributions are more
focused and give more specific results. In the matching perspective, we provide a very general
characterization of stochastically stable matchings under the assumptions of the marriage
theorem (see Bose and Manvel, 1984 for a modern exposition, although this mathematical
result is already in Hall, 1935).
With respect to network formation models, we generalize pair-wise stability (see Jackson
and Wolinsky, 1996) and strong stability (Jackson and Van den Nouweland, 2005) to a
more general setting of resource-constrained team formation. The constraint imposed on
our agents by a fixed time resource has recently been modeled in network formation models,
e.g., by Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2012). On the other hand, the constraints imposed by
the technology can be related to many aspects recently introduced in the network formation
literature: constraints may be due to homophily (see Currarini et al., 2009), because only
similar agents may be able to form a team together; or they may be related to an exogenous
network of opportunities, because only linked agents have the opportunity to match (on
this, we are aware only of Franz et al., 2010); or they may be imposed by complementary
exogenous skills that need to be matched together (see, e.g., Currarini and Vega-Redondo,
2010).
Stochastic stability (for which the references are discussed in Section 4) has been applied
to networks (first by Jackson and Watts, 2002). More recently Klaus et al. (2010) used
stochastic stability as a predicitive tool for roommate markets. In Boncinelli and Pin (2012),
best shot games played in exogenous networks are analyzed, and stochastically stable states
are proven to be the states with the maximum number of contributing agents if the error
structure is such that contributing agents are much more likely to be hit by perturbations.
Our concept of coalitional stability stems from concepts of cooperative game theory, and
particularly from the literature on coalition formation (see, e.g., Konishi and Ray, 2003,
Gomes and Jehiel, 2005 and Hyndman and Ray, 2007) and clubs (see, e.g., Pauly, 1970 and
Faias and Luque, 2012). We provide further references and undertake an in-depth discussion
on this in Section 5.
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1.4 Plan of the paper
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present all the aspects of the model,
without any definition of stability. In Section 3 we introduce and discuss the weak notion
of myopic team-wise stability, which is then refined with the tools of stochastic stability in
Section 4, and with a concept of coalitional stability in Section 5. In Section 6 we combine
our result on stochastic stability with the marriage theorem to provide a characterization
of perfect matchings. Section 7 lists possible extensions of our study, and some additional
discussion and results are in the Appendices.
2 Model
2.1 The team formation model
We take into consideration a finite set N of n agents. Each agent i has an endowment
wi ∈ N1 of a time resource. We denote by w ∈ Nn1 the vector of endowments of all agents.2
A team is a vector t ∈ Nn, t ≤ w, with ti indicating the amount of time employed by agent
i in a joint task. We denote by T the set of teams.
Let A be a finite set of activities (or tasks). A project p = (a, t) is an activity a ∈ A
carried out by a team t ∈ T . We use set P ⊆ A×T to collect all projects p = (a, t) such that
team t is able to accomplish activity a. We can think of P as representing the technology,
since it indicates, for every possible task, which combinations of inputs allow the task to
be completed.3 It will simplify the following exposition to introduce, with a slight abuse
of notation, the auxiliary function n(p) = n(a, t) ≡ |{i ∈ N : ti > 0}|, which gives us the
set of agents that put some positive amount of time (possibly different among agents) into
2We denote by N the set of non-negative integers, and by N1 the set of positive integers.
3 A complementary interpretation of the technology P is based on the agents’ preferences. From this
point of view, P allows only for those teams in which no member would rather stay alone than participate
in the project. In the literature on matching this condition is called individual rationality and it is also
used in decentralized matching models (Roth and Vate, 1990). We observe, however, that interpreting P as
individual rationality asks for a different model when combining mistakes with exit costs (see Appendix A):
in such a case, a project that is formed by mistake persists over time due to the costs for exiting, even if
some agent would prefer to stay alone. Finally, we point out that, when allowed, both interpretations for the
technology can co-exist: a project is technologically feasible if such a team is able to perform the activity
and, at the same time, every agent is willing to do so.
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project p. Another notation we will use is h(p) = h(a, t) ≡∑Ni=1 ti, which indicates the total
amount of time (e.g., hours) employed on aggregate by the agents in project p.
In the following discussion we will often use teams and projects as synonyms, but some
clarification is necessary. A project p = (a, t) characterizes an activity a performed by a
team t, where t specifies not only the members of the team (who are in the set n(p)) but
also how much time each of them devote to the project. While every project p can occur
only once in a state, because every activity a can be executed only once by the same team,
the same team t can occur in different projects, if this is allowed by the technology P , i.e.,
if there are at least two projects (a, t), (b, t) ∈ P , with a 6= b.
We use e(x) =
∑
(a,t)∈x t to indicate the vector collecting the overall amount of resources
employed in state x, agent by agent. We say that x is feasible if e(x) ≤ w, and we denote
by X the set of feasible states. We also introduce function `(x) = |x| that simply counts the
number of projects that are completed in state x.
Finally, we introduce utilities that agents earn depending on the state they are in. For
every i ∈ N , and for every x ∈ X, we denote by ui(x) the utility gained by agent i in state
x.
Given these elements, it is possible to define a team formation model with the quintuple
(N,w, P,X,u). The primitives are the set N of agents involved, their constraints w, the
set P of projects allowed by technology, and agents’ utilities u. Given N , w and P , it is
possible to derive the partially ordered set X of all feasible states.
2.2 Assumptions
In deriving our results, we employ the following restrictions on the possible structure of
teams (first three) and on utilities (second group of three). We explicitly refer to each of
these assumption whenever used. We note that some of them are a refinement of one another,
while others are incompatible.
Assumption t1. In every (a, t) ∈ P , we have for every i ∈ N that either ti = 0 or ti = 1.
Assumption t1 states that the time allocated to each feasible project by every agent is
always 0 or 1, or simply (up to a normalization of time) that the time allocated to each
feasible project by its participants is a constant of the model which is homogeneous across
projects for every agent.
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In contrast, the next two are assumptions that exogenously fix the number of members
in each team. We will discuss them in more detail in Section 2.4 where we will see how our
model is a generalization of other common theoretical setups.
Assumption s1. There is a k ∈ N1, such that for every p ∈ P , we have that |n(p)| = k.
The following Assumption s2 is a refinement of Assumption s1, where k is fixed to be
equal to 2.
Assumption s2. For every p ∈ P , we have that |n(p)| = 2.
We now present some assumptions that specify how agents gain utilities by performing
activities in teams.
Assumption v0. For every x, x′ ∈ X, with x′ 6= x and x′ = x ∪ {p}, and for every i ∈ N
such that i ∈ n(p), we have that ui(x′) > ui(x).
Assumption v0 is the only one that is needed for our main result. It states that the
marginal utility in forming a team, for each of its members, is always positive, independently
of all other teams in place. We note that this assumption allows for a large variety of
externalities that a project may have on the utility of non-members of that team, or on the
fact that the same team could bring different marginal effects to its members, depending on
the state.
An additional possible restriction is to impose that the aggregate utility of each project
is constant across projects (normalized to 1).
Assumption v1. For each x ∈ X, ∑i∈N ui(x) = |x|.
Finally, we will consider also a more restrictive assumption that asks for linearity in
teams membership, so making the marginal value of each team, for each of its members,
independent on states.
Assumption v2. For each state x ∈ X, and any agent i ∈ N , we have that ui(x) = v · |{p ∈
x : i ∈ n(p)}|, with v ∈ R+.
The last two assumptions convey different ideas on the assignment of utilities: while
Assumption v1 imposes that the aggregate marginal value of each team is 1, Assumption
v2 says that the payoff earned by each agent i is merely given by the number of projects in
which i participates. We note that the two assumptions are compatible only if Assumption
s1 holds as well, in which case we have v = 1
k
.
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2.3 Maximal states
We observe that X is a partially ordered set under inclusion. This is because, for any two
states x and x′ belonging to X, we can have that either x is included in x′, or x′ is included
in x, or no set inclusion relationship can be established between them. However, as the
empty state x0 is included in any other state, it is the only minimal state (or the least state)
and, given two states x and x′, the set of those states that are included in both is always
non-empty. On the other hand, as there is a threshold w on the overall available resources,
there may not always be a common superset for any two states. In general there will be many
maximal states, i.e., states above which it is not possible to include other teams, because
otherwise the threshold would be exceeded.
We denote byM the set of maximal states,M = {x ∈ X : x ⊆ x′ and x 6= x′ ⇒ x′ /∈ X}.
We denote by L the set of states with maximum number of completed projects, L = {x ∈
X : |x| ≥ |x′|, for all x′ ∈ X}. We observe that L ⊆ M. In fact, if x ∈ X and x /∈ M,
then there exists a feasible state that can be obtained from x by adding some project, and x
cannot maximize the number of projects. In contrast, there exist in general maximal states
that do not maximize the number of projects, as the following example shows.
Example 1 (Maximal states and maximum number of projects). Consider the case in which
N = {i, j, k,m}, w = (2, 2, 2, 2), A = {a, b}, and P = {(a, (1, 1, 0, 0)), (b, (1, 1, 0, 0)), (a, (0, 1, 1, 0)),
(b, (0, 1, 1, 0)), (a, (0, 0, 1, 1)), (b, (0, 0, 1, 1))}. This is a situation in which there are four agents
with two units of time each, there are two activities to be performed, and each activity re-
quires that either {i, j}, or {j, k}, or {k,m} must be involved, with one unit of time each.
We note that Assumptions t1 and s2 hold. Figure 1 illustrates the partial order on set X
resulting from the above assumptions: an arrow from a state x to another state y indicates
that we can pass from x to y by adding a single project.4 There are three maximal states,
but only one of them maximizes the number of projects.
2.4 Why this generalization?
The theoretical setup we have introduced encompasses different matching models with non-
transferable utility that have been developed in the literature. We acknowledge that some
4In order to provide a simplified figure, we have summarized in a single node the states that are the
same in any respect apart from the labels of activities.
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Figure 1: The partially ordered set X of all feasible states for the team formation model of
Example 1. In this graphical representation – where we have not considered differences in
activities, focussing only on their number – there are three maximal states, which are those
underlined in black.
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of the existing models might be stretched to deal with most of the cases analyzed within
our setup. However, we claim that our model is a natural and simple container for all these
models, and we find a value in its capability to adapt easily so as to take into consideration
specific cases. In the following we will illustrate this capability.
The knapsack problem (presented in Subsection 1.1) is obtained if we have only one agent
who can carry an overall weight of w (the resource endowment) in her knapsack, and she can
choose objects (or activities) in set A, where every object a ∈ A has value va and weight wa.
A project is here an object with its weight, i.e., (a, wa). A state is a set of objects within
the knapsack, such that the sum of weights does not exceed w. The agent’s utility in state
x is the sum of values of the objects in the knapsack.
Cooperative games with non-transferable utility are obtained in our setup if we specify
that each agent can belong to one coalition only, and that no externalities are allowed. In
order to deal with matching, we simply need to add Assumption s2, so that only teams of
size two are allowed to be formed. Marriage – that is bipartite matching – can be obtained
through adequate constraints on the technology; after dividing the set of agents between
males and females, only heterosexual pairs are allowed in P , and additional constraints can
also be considered. Figure 2 provides an example. We will discuss in detail this example
and a general application of our setup to marriage in Section 6.
w1 w2 w3
m1 m2 m3 m4
Figure 2: A marriage problem. In this example there are three women (w1, w2 and w3) and
four men (from m1 to m4). Feasible pairs are joined by a link.
If, instead, we relax the upper bound on w, still following Assumption s2, then any
state can be considered as a network that satisfies the constraints imposed by w (concern-
ing the maximum degree of nodes), and the connections made available by technology P
(representing the exogenous network of opportunities). This is illustrated in the following
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example.
Example 2 (Co-authorships). A popular and seminal model in the economic literature on
networks is the “Co-author model” of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996): agents are researchers
and links are pair-wise collaborations on scientific projects, which are costly but provide
payoffs that depend endogenously on the negative externalities given by each collaboration
to the other co-authors of an author.
We can include in our setup a payoff function with costs and negative externalities of a
project p = (a, t) on the members of other teams that are formed by the members of t, as in
the original model. However, our model allows for more generality and also for more realistic
time constraints5 that can be imposed on the available (multi-)matchings. First of all, (i)
some agents may work alone, but even three or more agents can set up a team together and
produce a paper, as happens in the profession. Then, (ii) with regard to constraints, there
could be an exogenous network G of acquaintances, so that a group of co-authors is possible
only if they are mutually connected in G. Or, (iii) the researchers could have exogenous
complementary skills, and only projects involving agents with enough diversity could be
successful. Aspects such as the three listed above, and even others, could all be modeled by
some technology P .
So, what is the added value of our setup with respect to existing ones, in terms of
representation of real world phenomena? To provide an answer through an example, let
us stick to the co-authorship model of Example 2. Imagine that agents i, j and k set up a
project p together, so that |n(p)| = 3. This could be represented in the original co-authorship
model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), that allows only for couples, by saying that i is linked
to j and k, and j and k are also linked together. We observe that the link between i and j
would have a negative externality on each neighbor of these agents, including k. However,
in the general setup and in reality, the fact that i and j are in a three-agent collaboration
has a positive externality on the third agent k, and a negative externality on the others.
Formally, this could be done in the original network formation model by specifying, for each
link between two agents, and for any other agent, the sign of the externality of that link on
5It can be reasonable to assume (at least in certain contexts) that everyone likes to be in as many projects
as possible, and hence that Assumption v0 is satisfied. With this interpretation, costs arise indirectly as
opportunity costs due to the constraint given by available time.
12
the third agent. It is clear that this would seriously complicate the notation, and that only
a more general framework such as the one we use can overcome such difficulties.
We finish this section with two stylized but fairly general applications that show how the
possibilities and the competing incentives of some environments cannot be dealt with using
the standard models of matching and network formation.
2.5 Application One: The publishing model
We present here an extended example providing the general idea of the model. We continue
to adopt an intuition related to the daily experience of everyone in the academic profession,
but it is clear that it can easily be extended to R&D between firms that are competing in
a market, as in the model of Goyal and Joshi (2003). Consider a world where there are n
homogeneous scientific authors, each trying to form teams of collaborators and each with a
common time constraint w. They all have two goals: a good output in terms of publications
(on which they compete with colleagues), but also the objective of doing good research that
can provide advancements in the field. Each author maximizes in each project both the
probability of being published and the probability of authoring a good idea. We assume no
constraint on the multi-matching technology P , except for the fact that agents cannot work
alone: p ∈ P if and only if |n(p)| ≥ 2.
Here we assume that a project p has a strictly positive divulgative fitness (i.e., an expected
popularity) that we call φ(p). The divulgative fitness of a paper may depend on the amount
of work that is put into the paper by its members. This fitness can clearly also be related
to heterogeneous exogenous factors.
Accordingly, a paper’s probability of being published has the multinomial form:6
Ppub(p) =
φ(p)∑
q∈x φ(q)
.
When a new team is formed there are clear negative externalities (increasing in the divul-
gative fitness of the new project) for all the agents that are not members of the new team,
because their probabilities of being published decrease.
6We set up the model as if only one paper is published, but this can be easily relaxed as long as the
number of published papers is fixed and independent of the aggregate fitness.
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In a related but not necessarily collinear way, we assume that each project has a strictly
positive probability of providing a good idea which is Pgood(p). This probability is reasonably
increasing in effort, but there may be communication and coordination costs which make
it decrease in the size, in terms of members, of the team. Or, there could be positive
externalities from the aggregate quality of all the scientific production as a whole. In general,
the whole environment of x can provide both positive and negative externalities, with network
effects like those described in the connection model and in the co-authorship model of Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996).
To provide a simplified functional form, which maintains the general idea, we assume
that each author i receives a payoff in a generic state x that is:
ui(x) =
∑
p:i∈n(p)
(
UPpub(p) +
V
|n(p)| · Pgood(p)
)
,
where U and V are positive numbers, homogeneous for all agents,7 and Pgood(p) does not
depend on other existing projects in x. We observe that, while the utility U coming from a
publication is not affected by the number of authors (what matters is to have a publication
in the curriculum), the benefits V deriving from a good idea must be shared among the
participants (consider, for instance, the earnings that come from a patented idea).
For this simplified model it is not difficult to prove that it satisfies Assumption v0.8
That is because, for an agent i, if we call Φ ≡∑q∈x:i∈n(q) φ(q), the marginal utility for being
member of a new project p′ is:
ui(x ∪ p′)− ui(x) = U
(
φ(p′)
∑
q∈x:i 6∈n(q) φ(q)
(Φ + φ(p′)) Φ
)
+ V · Pgood(p′).
7In a context of industrial organization, with R&D between firms, U could be the aggregate value of a
fixed market, on which firms compete for shares, while V could be the expected value of further markets
that new products could open.
8It is possible to provide more complicated payoff functions, which are non-linear or for which Pgood(p) is
state dependent, and which also satisfy Assumption v0. A simple but reasonable first step of generalization
is by assuming the existence of non-negative net externalities on Pgood(p) that come from a member of n(p)
that participates in other projects. This would bring our model closer to the connection model than to the
co-authorship model. Indeed, the negative externalities of the co-authorship model are an indirect way to
take into account the scarcity of time that researchers face in their activity; the reason for such externalities
is removed in our setting, where agents are explicitly given time endowments.
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The first term is non-negative, and it is null only if that agent was already a member of each
existing team. The second term is strictly positive by definition.
2.6 Application Two: The connection model with heterogeneous
skills
Finally, we conclude the section with a model that is again related to the connection model of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), but agents also have heterogeneous skills and in equilibrium
we have the features of assortative matching (Becker, 1973). We consider n agents (n is
even), where each agent i has an exogenous and individual specific skill σ(i). We have also `
activities, where agents can participate in couples, so that Assumption s2 holds and a team
is always composed of two agents, but in contrast to a standard network formation model
the agents can form at most ` couples (one for each activity) and overlapping couples (two
agents working on more than one project) are possible. In this sense it can be seen as an
overlapping matching model (see Example 7 on the possibility of excluding overlaps) and to
maintain this relation we will call the teams matchings as well.
The utility accruing to agents in a generic state has two separable (to maintain things
easy) components. First, agent i has a payoff from each matching that she makes with any
agent j, and this payoff is a function g(σ(i), σ(j)) that is increasing in the partner’s skill. For
the case of a single activity (` = 1), it is well known that this leads to positive assortative
matching. But there is also a second component to the utility function: if we consider all
the matchings over all the ` activities we obtain a network, where a link between agents i
and j is present if and only if they are matched in at least one activity. On this network we
consider the geodesic distance d(i, j) between any two nodes (i.e., the length of the minimum
path between them), and the standard connection payoff (see again Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996)), that assigns to agent i a payoff β · δd(i,j) for each other agent (node) j to which she
is directly or indirectly connected. As these payoffs are non negative and have non negative
externalities on the payoffs of other teams, it is easy to check that property v0 holds.
Depending on the parameter β and on the functional form of g, this model can exhibit
some externalities that are not internalized by the agents. In particular, if β is too small,
each activity will have independent incentives, so that the matchings on each of them will
tend to be exact replicas, and the resulting network will be made only of n/2 disconnected
couples. This may lead to an inefficient network, because it is poorly connected.
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In Examples 6 and 7, when comparing stability notions, we will consider a specific ana-
lytical example for this model.
3 Myopic team-wise stability
The first equilibrium notion that we provide – called myopic team-wise stability – is a direct
generalization of the concept of pair-wise stabiliy, from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), which
is used in network formation games.
3.1 Myopically team-wise stable states
The following definition formalizes the notion:
Definition 1. A state x is myopically team-wise stable [MTS] if
(i) for any project p ∈ x, and for any agent i ∈ n(p), we have that ui(x) ≥ ui(x\{p});
(ii) there exists no project p ∈ P such that x ∪ {p} ∈ X and, for any agent i ∈ n(p),
ui(x) ∪ {p} > ui(x).
In words, a state x is myopically team-wise stable, if (i) there is no agent that would
be better off by deleting a project she belongs to; and (ii) there is no project that could
be added to state x, without hitting the constraints of its members, and which would make
them all strictly better off.9 With some abuse of notation, we also denote by MTS the set
of states that are myopically team-wise stable.
The reason why we call it myopic is that it considers only deviations of one single step in
the partially ordered set X.10 Note also that, even if a dynamic is implicit in the definition,
this concept of equilibrium is a static one. Again, for comparison with and discussion on the
network formation case see Jackson and Watts (2002).
The following Lemma is the first building block of our results.
9We require a strict Pareto improvement for the members of a project that is going to be formed in order
to conclude that a state is not myopically team-wise stable, while a weak Pareto improvement is usually
considered sufficient. We remark that our choice – which in principle yields a weaker equilibrium concept –
makes no actual difference if Assumption v0 is satisfied.
10The network concept of pair-wise stability is likewise myopic. On this see Page et al. (2005) and
discussion in Mantovani et al. (2011).
16
Lemma 1. Take a team formation model satisfying Assumption v0. We have that MTS =
M.
Proof. If a state is maximal it is not possible to add a project, and any deletion would
damage the members of the removed project (by Assumption v0). Therefore, that state is
MTS.
Suppose that a state is not maximal, then it would be possible to add a project, which
would add a positive marginal amount to the utility of all its members (by Assumption v0),
and thus that state is not myopically team-wise stable.
3.2 Direct and indirect externalities
Our specification allows for externalities between the agents, or for a non-trivial structure
of preferences of the agents toward the other team members. All the inefficiencies arising
because positive and negative externalities are not endogenized by the agents would give rise
to a comparison between stable and efficient outcomes that would be very similar to the one
extensively analyzed in network formation models (see Jackson, 2005).
However, even if utilities from states had a simple structure, e.g., as in the case of the
one imposed by Assumption v2, numerous indirect effects would arise from the constraints
imposed by the technology P , and by the vector w of endowments, as will be clear from the
following examples.
First of all, consider again the case illustrated in Example 1 and Figure 1. Because of
the constraints imposed by the technology, agents j and k clearly have a negative externality
on the other two agents when they form a team together: by forming a team on an activity
they reduce the available teams for agents i and m.
Example 3. Consider a team formation model with four agents: i, j, k and m, all with an
endowment of 3 units of time. Agent i can form a team with j only, if one of the two puts
in 1 unit and the other 2 units of time. The same holds for the couple formed by k and m.
Agents j and k, on the other hand, can form a team together by investing only one unit
of time each. As illustrated graphically in Figure 3, this team formation model has three
myopically team-wise stable sets: I, II and III.11 The payoff of a project for an agent is
11We use here the same simplifying representation that we have employed in Figure 1 and briefly discussed
in footnote 4.
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always 1
2
. Therefore, this example does not satisfy Assumption t1, but satisfies Assumptions
s2 and v2.
In this case, even if all the teams have the same payoff for each of their members, there
are indirect preferences for some of the agents. In particular, if agents j and k could choose
ex ante their teams they would rather form teams together, because this would allow them
to form up to 3 teams, while forming a team with i or m (respectively) would bind them to
myopically team-wise stable sets where they can form at most two teams. We will formalize
in Section 5 the idea of ‘choosing ex ante’ and ‘would rather ’.
 
i j  k m 
e 
1 
2 
3 
N 
e 
1 
2 
3 
N 
 
e 
1 
2 
3 
N 
II 
III 
I 
i j  k m 
i j  k m 
Figure 3: MTS states of Example 3.
Example 4. As the model is specified, it is not possible to specify indirect externalities of
the following form: a team is feasible if and only if another team is not, and possibly also the
other way round. As an example consider Case I in Figure 4, where we may want to express
a condition by which the team (i, j) can be active only if the team (k,m) is not active.
Another example could be one in which the same subset of agents cannot simultaneously
work on more than one project, even if many are independently feasible (and this is a case
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we will discuss in Example 7). It is possible however to model a similar situation including
fictitious agents, with a dummy utility function, whereby the agents have limited resources of
time and must be included as members in the teams that we want to be mutually exclusive.
We will not develop all the formal definitions of this approach, but we maintain the simple
example given in Figure 4: as illustrated in Case II it is possible to add a fictitious agent h
with wh = 1, and such that the possible teams are now (i, j, h) and (k,m, h). In this way
the original two teams become mutually exclusive.
i 
j 
k 
m 
i 
j 
k 
m 
h 
Case I Case II 
Project p Project p’ Project p Project p’ 
Figure 4: The two cases discussed in Example 4.
4 Stochastic stability
To refine MTS we consider an unperturbed dynamics where absorbing states are myopically
team-wise stable states, and we then insert vanishing perturbations with the aim of refining
our prediction by means of stochastic stability.
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4.1 Unperturbed dynamics and preliminary results
In order to deal with stochastic stability, we need to introduce an underlying dynamics which
describes the probabilistic passage from state to state, and then to add perturbations. In
particular, we work with discrete time and we indicate it with s = 0, 1, . . .. We denote the
state of the system at time s with xs. At time s + 1 a single project p ∈ P is drawn, with
every project in P having positive probability of being drawn.
One remark is worth making at this point. Extensive heterogeneity is allowed between the
probabilities of different projects being drawn; for instance, it might be reasonable to assume
that better projects (in some sense) are more likely to be selected and then implemented.
As long as every feasible project has a positive, even tiny, probability of being drawn all our
results remain valid.
The extracted project p will actually be formed if x∪{p} is feasible, i.e., e(x∪{p}) ≤ w.
Otherwise, such a team is not formed, since its creation is not possible due to resource
constraints. In any case, state xs+1 is reached. We refer to this dynamic process as myopic
team-wise dynamics.
A Markov chain (X,D) turns out to be defined, where X is the state space and D
the transition matrix, with Dxx′ denoting the probability of moving from state x to state
x′. We recall some concepts and results in Markov chain theory, following Young (1998).
Given any two states x, x′ ∈ X, state x′ is said to be accessible from state x if there exists
a sequence of states starting from x and reaching x′ such that the system can move with
positive probability from each state to the next state. A set E of states is called an ergodic
set (or recurrent class) when each state in E is accessible from any other state in E , and no
state outside of E is accessible from any state in E . If E is an ergodic set and x ∈ E , then x
is called recurrent. Let R denote the set of all recurrent states of (X,D). If an ergodic set is
made of a single element, such a state is called absorbing. Equivalently, x is absorbing when
Dxx = 1. Let A denote the set of all absorbing states of (X,D). Clearly, an absorbing state
is recurrent, hence A ⊆ R.
The following Proposition proves that there are no recurrent states other than absorbing
states, and provides a characterization of absorbing states as maximal states, and thus as
myopically team-wise stable states.
Proposition 2. Take a team formation model satisfying Assumption v0 and a myopic
team-wise dynamics. We have that A = R =M = MTS.
20
Proof. From the definitions of R and A, we know that A ⊆ R. Moreover, from Lemma 1,
we have that M = MTS.
Take x /∈ M. An additional project can be formed, and once formed, state x will never
be visited again in the future. This shows, by contraposition, that R ⊆M and A ⊆M.
Finally, consider any state x ∈ M. Since existing projects never disappear, and no
new project is feasible starting from x, we can conclude that x is absorbing. Therefore,
M⊆ A.
4.2 Perturbed dynamics and stochastically stable states
We are ready to introduce perturbations in the unperturbed dynamics considered in the pre-
vious subsection, and then use the techniques developed by Foster and Young (1990), Young
(1993), Kandori et al. (1993). Basically, we suppose that with a tiny amount of probability
active projects may accidentally dissolve, and possibly (but not necessarily) non-existing
projects can be formed if feasible. By so doing, the dynamic system under consideration
becomes ergodic, and from known results it follows that there exists a unique probabil-
ity distribution among states that is stationary and describes the limiting behavior of the
Markov chain as time goes to infinity, irrespectively of the initial state. Then we consider
the limit of this stationary distribution for the amount of perturbation decreasing to zero.
Those states that are visited with positive probability in this limiting stationary distribution
are called stochastically stable.
We invite the reader who is interested in a formal exposition of perturbed Markov chain
theory to consult Young (1993) and Ellison (2000), while in the following we simply make
use of the resistance function r : X ×X → R+ ∪ {∞}, where r(x, x′) indicates the minimal
amount of perturbations required to move the system from x to x′ in one unit of time. If
r(x, x′) = 0 then the system moves from x to x′ with positive probability in the unperturbed
dynamics, i.e., Txx′ > 0, while r(x, x
′) =∞ is interpreted as impossibility of moving from x
to x′ in one unit of time even when perturbations are allowed.
We rely on the techniques and results illustrated in Foster and Young (1990), Young
(1993) and Young (1998), as they provide a relatively easy way to identify which states are
stochastically stable. More precisely, we restrict attention to absorbing states (since there
are no other recurrent states by virtue of Proposition 2), and for any pair (x, x′) of absorbing
states we define r∗(x, x′) as the minimum sum of the resistances between states over any
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path starting in x and ending in x′. Then, for any absorbing state x, we define an x-tree
as a tree having root at x and all absorbing states as nodes. The resistance of an x-tree is
defined as the sum of the r∗ resistances of its edges. Finally, the stochastic potential of x is
said to be the minimum resistance over all trees rooted at x.
A state x is proven to be stochastically stable (Foster and Young, 1990) if and only if x has
minimum stochastic potential in the set of absorbing states. Intuitively, stochastic stability
selects those states that are easiest to reach from other states, with “easiest” interpreted as
requiring the fewest mutations (as measured by the stochastic potential).
We now introduce two alternative perturbation schemes in the unperturbed dynamics
considered in the previous subsection. The two perturbation schemes lead us to the same
results. The first one is called a uniform perturbation scheme, and it is such that at every
time s each project p ∈ P has an i.i.d. probability  subject to an error; such an error makes
the project disappear if existing, and be formed if non-existing and xs∪{p} ∈ X. The second
perturbation scheme is such that only existing projects can be hit by a perturbation, so that
each existing project disappears with an i.i.d. probability . We refer to this modeling of
errors as a uniform destructive perturbation scheme.12 It is easy to check that the perturbed
system is irreducible and aperiodic: from any state x ∈ X, every existing project may
dissolve by means of perturbations, and then one project per period may form, leading the
system to any state x′. Every project can form in the unperturbed dynamics, thanks to
Assumption v0, and hence perturbations creating new projects (that are allowed only in the
uniform perturbation scheme) do not play any significant role. Aperiodicity is ensured since
there are no recurrent states other than absorbing states (see Proposition 2).
We denote by SS the set of stochastically stable states. The following proposition identi-
fies stochastically stable states as the states with the maximum number of existing projects.
Proposition 3. Take a team formation model satisfying Assumption v0, a team-wise dy-
namics and either a uniform destructive perturbation scheme or a uniform perturbation
scheme. Then, SS = L.
Proof. Consider any two absorbing states x, x′ ∈ X. In order to move from x to x′ it is
necessary for all projects that exist at x and do not exist at x′ to be stopped, and this
12For our result we do not require the probabilities to be equal, and every team t could have any state and
time dependent utility η(p, x, s, ), depending also on some positive real number . Thus we merely require
that all such probabilities converge to zero with the same order as  goes to 0.
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can only occur by means of `(x) − `(x ∩ x′) perturbations, both in the uniform destructive
perturbation scheme and in the uniform perturbation scheme. In contrast, projects that exist
at x′ and do not exist at x can form in the unperturbed dynamics, thanks to Assumption
v0. Therefore:
r∗(x, x′) = `(x)− `(x ∩ x′). (1)
We are ready to prove SS ⊆ L. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose x /∈ L. Then we can
find an x′ such that `(x′) > `(x). Take any x-tree and consider the path from x′ to x, say
(x′, x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xk, x). By (1), the sum of resistances over this path is `(x′)− `(x′ ∩ x1) +
`(x1) − `(x1 ∩ x2) + . . . + `(xk−1) − `(xk−1 ∩ xk) + `(xk) − `(xk ∩ x). We now consider the
x′-tree obtained from the x-tree by reversing the path from x′ to x. Again by (1), the sum of
resistances over this reversed path is `(x)−`(x∩xk)+`(xk)−`(xk∩xk−1)+. . .+`(x2)−`(x2∩
x1) + `(x1)− `(x1∩x′). Taking the difference between the above sums of resistances over the
two paths, we obtain that the x′-tree has a resistance which is equal to the resistance of the
x-tree +`(x)− `(x′). Since `(x′) > `(x), we can conclude that for any x-tree we can find an
x′-tree with a lower overall resistance, and hence the stochastic potential of x′ is lower than
the stochastic potential of x. Therefore, x cannot be stochastically stable.
We now prove L ⊆ SS. Since at least one stochastically stable state must exist, and we
have just seen that no state outside of L is stochastically stable, we can therefore conclude
that there exists an x ∈ L that is stochastically stable. Consider any other x′ ∈ L. Following
exactly the same reasoning as above we obtain that the stochastic potential of x′ must be
the same as the stochastic potential of x. Therefore, x′ is stochastically stable as well.
Proposition 3 is our main result. It provides a very precise characterization of stochasti-
cally stable states for every team formation model that satisfies the general assumption v0,
and under the perturbation schemes that we have considered.
To aid intuitive comprehension, we provide the following discussion. In the representation
of all the states in X as a partially ordered set, with the empty state at the top and maximal
states at the bottom, an error can be seen as a step upwards, while the adapting best response
of agents (under Assumption v0) can be seen as a step downwards. Consider Example 1 as
represented in Figure 1. In this case, the bottom left state is SS, because it would need at
least two errors before the system can move in the unperturbed dynamics to another MTS
state. To move away from the other two MTS states, on the other hand, only one error is
required.
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Clearly, the fact that SS states maximize the number of teams in the state, does not tell
us anything about efficiency, because the utility function could have a structure that highly
rewards agents in states with few teams. However, under an additional assumption we can
prove the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Given a team formation model, under Assumption v1, every stochastically
stable state is Pareto efficient.
Proof. By Proposition 3 a stochastically stable state x maximizes the number of projects
`(x). By Assumption v1 we have `(x) =
∑
i∈N ui(x), so that x also maximizes the aggregate
utility to agents. Thus, there is no other state that can provide a higher utility for some
agent, without damaging any other agent.
4.3 Descriptive value of stochastic stability
In this section we have shown that in a team formation model stochastically stable states
coincide with maximal states. This result rests not only on Assumption v0 and a large class
of perturbation schemes, but also on individual behavior that is boundedly rational. In
particular, no agent will ever exit from existing projects in order to free up time and start
other projects, despite the fact that this may increase her utility. Given this circumstance,
one may then query the descriptive value of stochastic stability. An answer clearly depends
on the specific case under consideration. We limit ourselves to the following observations.
Even if agents have sufficient cognitive skills to recognize the possibility of an increase in
utility, there are at least two kinds of reasons that might prevent them from doing so. First,
coordination issues: in order to carry out a utility enhancement, an agent has to quit projects
with some teams and contextually start other projects with new teams, and this involves
coordinating the actions of several agents. Second, switching costs: these costs may be due
to legal obligations – consider for instance divorce costs in marriage – or to learning how to
operate in new teams.
Nevertheless, in the following section we analyze a refinement of myopic team-wise sta-
bility based on strong rationality and absence of coordination and switching costs.
In Appendix A we consider a variant of the team formation model where agents are en-
dowed with unlimited cognitive and coordination skills, but face switching costs when leaving
an existing project. We show that when switching costs are high enough, stochastically stable
states are exactly those states having the maximum number of existing projects.
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5 Coalitional stability
In this section we introduce a concept of stability – coalitional stability – which is strongly
based on coordination opportunities and rationality of agents. Then we compare it with
myopic team-wise stability and stochastic stability, providing a class of situations where
coalitional stability has no refining power.
5.1 Coalitionally stable states
We consider the following definition:
Definition 2. A state x is coalitionally stable [CS] (or coalition proof) if there exists no
subset C ⊆ N such that
(i) there exists a set of projects y ⊆ x such that ∀ p ∈ y, ∃ i ∈ C such that i ∈ n(p);
(ii) there exists a set of projects z such that z∩x = ∅ and, ∀ p ∈ z, if j ∈ n(p) then j ∈ C;
(iii) (x\y) ∪ z ∈ X and for any agent i ∈ C we have that ui((x\y) ∪ z) > ui(x).
In words, a state x is coalitionally stable if there is no coalition that can (i) erase a set of
projects, each of which contains at least one agent of the coalition, (ii) form a set of other
projects, where all the members of each are also members of the coalition, and (iii) make
all the members of the coalition strictly better off in the resulting state.13 We denote by CS
the set of states that are coalitionally stable.
It is evident that this definition allows for a profound rationality by the agents: they
can identify and coordinate a deviation through a long path in the partially ordered set
X. This definition allows the agents to maintain some of their existing teams with other
agents outside of the coalition, and in this sense it is a generalization of bilateral deviations
defined in a network formation setting by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). The literature
on clubs (e.g., Pauly, 1970 and Faias and Luque, 2012) focusses on deviations where all clubs
are deleted when members are both outside and inside the coalition. Note finally that we
13In contrast to what happens for myopic team-wise stability (see footnote 9), the choice to require a strict
Pareto improvement for the agents of a blocking coalition – instead of asking for a weak Pareto improvement
– can enlarge the set of coalitionally stable states even when Assumption v0 is satisfied. However, this
difference ceases to exist when we introduce costs to exit from existing projects (see Appendix A).
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are not providing a general result of existence of CS states, for which we may need a more
general concept of stability such as the one provided in more specific settings by Herings
et al. (2009, 2010). However, we will focus on situations in which we can compare CS states
with SS states, so that a simpler definition suffices.14 In Appendix A we provide more
general definitions, which integrate this approach with that of stochastic stability.
5.2 A comparison between notions of stability
In the representation of all the states in X as a partially ordered set, the deviation of a
coalition can be seen as a path that moves first upwards and then downwards. Consider as
an example the whole states of Example 1 and Figure 1. Suppose that in this case the utility
that agents j and k receive from being together is always greater than the utility they receive
from being respectively with i and m. Then, the bottom left state that maximizes the number
of projects would not be CS: j and k could coordinate to delete all the existing projects and
start two projects together, moving to the state on the extreme right. Therefore, in general,
SS and CS states are not necessarily related concepts and can have empty intersections.
This can also clearly be seen if we look back at Example 3 and the related Figure 3. I and
II are stochastically stable, because they maximize the number of teams at four, while II
and III are coalitionally stable, because I can be broken by the coalition {j, k}.
There are cases in which SS and CS states can be a subset of one another, and given the
flexibility of the utility function u, a setup can always be provided, even under Assumption
v0, such that any desired subset of states would always be chosen by the grand coalition N .
On the other hand, there are many other cases, based on simple and general utility
functions, where the CS states do not provide a clear or apparently improving refinement
upon the CTS states. As an example, consider that in general CS states may not even be
14Some clarification is needed. The definition of farsighted coalitionally stable states, as proposed by
Herings et al. (2009, 2010) in a context where agents are farsighted players who evaluate the desirability of
a deviation in terms of its future consequences (see also Dutta et al., 2005 and Navarro, 2013), can easily
be generalized to our context, and this is what we achieve in Appendix B. The good thing about the above
definition is that there always exists a farsighted coalitionally stable state, while existence is not guaranteed
for simple coalitionally stable states, as we define them. Accordingly, they are a super-set of the coalitionally
stable states. However, our point is that in many contexts coalitional stability has too little predictive power,
so that the coalitionally stable states are too numerous or can be anything. We are not concerned here with
the point that in other contexts coalitional stability can be a concept so restrictive that no state satisfies it.
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Pareto efficient, because agents adhere to deviating coalitions only if their marginal profit
from doing so is strictly positive: thus, it could be that a Pareto improving deviation is
feasible through a coalition whose members will not all be strictly better off. An instance of
this sort is in the case provided by Example 1, under Assumption v2: the top right maximal
state of Figure 1, with only agents b and c forming teams, is a CS state, even if it is Pareto
dominated by the bottom left state (with all agents taking part in two teams each).
Here below we present a result for a case (which actually encompasses the previous
example) where CS states coincide with MTS states, so that they provide no refinement at
all with respect to the myopic and boundedly rational concept of myopic team-wise stability.
Proposition 5. Given a team formation model, under Assumptions t1 and v2, we have
that CS = MTS.
Proof. Since it is trivially true that CS ⊆ MTS, we focus on showing that MTS ⊆ CS.
Let us suppose this is not the case; then there is a team-wise stable state x which is not
coalitionally stable. From the definition, this means that in x there is a coalition C that can
erase a set y of projects and start a set z of new projects.
As agents in C need to strictly increase their utility (i.e., the number of teams to which
they belong, from Assumption v2), for each of the agents there is at least one unit of free
time in x; formally we have that ei(x) < wi for each i ∈ C.
As all the projects give strictly positive payoffs, then z is nonempty.
But then, as each team in z is formed by all and only agents from C, and by Assumption
t1 it would cost one unit of time each, then each project p ∈ w could be started already in
x, and x ∪ {p} ∈ X, i.e., it would be feasible. We have reached a contradiction with the
hypothesis that x is a team-wise stable state.
5.3 Some examples
We conclude this section with three examples, one on the publishing model and two on the
connection model with heterogeneous skills.
Example 5. Consider the publishing model presented in Section 2.5. Assume that the
divulgative fitness of a project is simply given by the amount of work put into it:
φ(p) = h(p).
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In a related way, the probability that a project is good is equal to:
Pgood(p) = (β · h(p)) γ|n(p)|−2,
where β is a small positive number, such that 1/β > maxm∈{2,...n} {wmγm−2} (and hence
Pgood(p) can correctly be interpreted as a probability), and γ ∈ (0, 1).15
We consider the case in which there are only 4 agents, each with an endowment of two
hours (i.e., w = 2). We recall that the only technological constraint in the publishing model
is represented by a minimum size of two agents for a team to be able to write a paper.
Our characterization of SS allows us to conclude that SS states are those with four
projects, where every project is made up of a team of two co-authors working one hour each.
The utility earned by each agent in this case is U/2 + 2βV . Furthermore, every agent earns
the same level of utility even in the states with only three or two projects, which are all
made up of two co-authors, possibly investing two hours each in a project. Consider now
the case in which three agents choose to exclude the fourth agent, who remains alone and
is unable to write a paper by herself. The three agents can either invest two hours each
on a single project, or one hour each in two distinct projects. In any case their utility is
U+2βV γ. If, instead, all four agents choose to form one big project, or two distinct projects,
the individual utility turns out to be U+2βV γ2. By solving the inequalities arising when we
compare the above individual utilities,16 we obtain that for γ ≤ 1 − U/(4βV ), coalitionally
stable states are states are states where all hours are invested and all projects are carried
out by two co-authors, while for γ ≥ 1 − U/(4βV ) they are states where three co-authors
invest all their time in one or two projects.
We assume that it is possible to make welfare considerations by aggregating utilities
across agents. It is easy to check that if γ ≤ √1− U/(4βV ) then efficient states are those
where all time is invested and all projects have two co-authors (and hence stochastic stability
leads to efficiency), while if γ ≥√1− U/(4βV ) then efficient states are those where projects
have four authors and all time is invested. Figure 5 summarizes all the results.
15For this example we could also have chosen φ(p) = Pgood(p). We did not, because in our view it is more
realistic to assume that the number of authors has a negative externality only on the quality of the project,
and not on its divulgative fitness. Consider also that the following part of this example would work even
when there is no competition for publishing: i.e., when U = 0.
16In actual fact, we should check that all other states are not relevant for the analysis. This amounts
merely to a list of simple but boring inequalities to be developed, which we prefer to skip.
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Figure 5: (1) SS coincides with CS, and is efficient; (2) SS is efficient but differs from CS,
which are states with 3 authors per project; (3) SS differs from CS, which are states with
3 authors per project, and from efficient states, which are those with 4 agents per project.
We conclude by remarking that the relationship between SS, CS and efficiency can be
far from obvious even in relatively simple examples.
Example 6. Consider the framework of the connection model with heterogeneous skills
(Section 2.6). Assume that agents are indexed by the n (n even) natural numbers, and that
the skill of each agent is precisely the corresponding number, so that σ(i) = i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Utilities are additive over projects for their members: g(i, j) = g(j, i) = α(i + j), with
α > 0. And finally, there is no decay in the connection part of the utility function (i.e.,
δ = 1) and β is so small that β < α
n−1 . In this model, a state in which all agents make
` matchings and the resulting network is connected provides an aggregate payoff to agents
equal to 2α (
∑n
i=1 i) + β · n(n− 1) = (α + β)n(n− 1).
It can be seen that with these assumptions there is a unique coalitionally stable state in
which agents 1 and 2 match together in all the ` activities (they make a profitable deviation
by connecting together even if they lose all the connections in the network), agents 3 and
4 match together in all activities, and so on up to agents n − 1 and n (who are left alone
and have only this matching possibility). This single coalitionally stable state reaches a
non-optimal aggregate utility for the agents of 2α (
∑n
i=1 i) + β · n = (α(n− 1) + β)n.
On the other hand, any myopically team-wise stable state in which all agents make `
matchings is stochastically stable. In Appendix C we show that for any ` ≥ 3 most of the
networks generated by these overlapping matchings are connected, and that as n grows the
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ratio of the connected networks approaches 100%. Hence, the stochastically stable states
are efficient most of the times, and as n → ∞ they are almost surely efficient, in terms of
aggregate utility.
Example 7. The trick in the previous example is that agents could seem to have the pos-
sibility of overlapping their match in multiple activities, and that the resulting network is
therefore not connected. However, it is possible to exclude overlapping matchings by intro-
ducing fictitious agents, as discussed in Example 4. Even if we assume the same structure of
the utility function as in the previous Example 6, and the limitation that two agents cannot
work on more than one activity together, then the coalitionally stable state would still not
result in a connected network.
However, if the number of activities is `, and n is a multiple on ` + 1, the first ` + 1
agents will form a fully connected cluster together, the agents indexed from ` + 2 to 2` + 2
will do likewise, and so on up to agents from n − ` to n (who are left alone and have only
these matching possibilities).
An example along the above lines is shown in Figure 6, for the case ` = 3 and n = 4. In
this case the first matching is the standard assortative one. In the second matching agent
1, who is pivotal, chooses her second choice, namely agent 3, and the other 6 agents adapt
accordingly. Finally, in the third matching agent 1 chooses her third choice. The resulting
network is made up of two separate fully connected clusters of 4 agents each.
6 An application to marriage
In this section we apply our results to a specific and typical group formation problem, namely
marriage.
We take into consideration two sets, W and M , that we refer to as a set of women and a
set of men respectively. Each man is interested in being matched with a woman he likes, and
each woman is interested in being matched with a man she likes. However, not all matches
are feasible (because of preferences and/or because of other constraints). We indicate by
P ⊆ W ×M the set of feasible pairs. In graph theory language, (W,M,P ) is equivalent to
a bipartite graph. Figure 2 provides an example.
It is useful to define for every woman w ∈ W the set of her feasible mates, M(w) = {m ∈
M : (w,m) ∈ P}. Analogously, we define for every man m ∈M the set of his feasible mates,
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Matching 1: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Matching 2: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Matching 3: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Resulting network: 
1 2 
3 
7 8 
7 8 
7 8 
4 
5 6 
8 7 
Figure 6: The three matchings and the resulting network discussed in Example 7.
W (m) = {w ∈ W : (w,m) ∈ P}. For the sake of an easy notation, we also define for every
W ′ ⊆ W , M(W ′) = ⋃w∈W ′ M(w), and for all M ′ ⊆M , W (M ′) = ⋃m∈M ′ W (m).
A matching is a feasible set of pairs, i.e., a set of feasible pairs such that every woman
is not matched with more than one man and every man is not matched with more than one
woman. Formally, a set of pairs x is said to be a matching if and only if x ⊆ T and for any
two distinct pairs (j, w) ∈ x and (j′, w′) ∈ x we have that j 6= j′ and w 6= w′. We denote by
X the set of all matchings.
Given a matching x we can define the set of unmarried women, W u(x) = {w′ ∈ W : w′ 6=
w for all (w,m) ∈ x}. Analogously, we can define the set of unmarried men, Mu(x) = {m′ ∈
M : m′ 6= m for all (w,m) ∈ x}. Finally we define the set of pairs that can still feasibly be
formed, F (x) = {(w,m) ∈ P : w ∈ W u(x),m ∈Mu(x)}.
In the above setting, the Marriage Theorem (see for example Bose and Manvel, 1984,
pag. 205-209) states a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a matching
where no woman and no man remain unmarried: basically, for any subset of women, and
of men, the corresponding set of feasible mates contains an at least equal number of mates.
Preliminarily, we say that a matching x is perfect if and only if W u(x) = ∅ and Mu(x) = ∅.
Theorem 6 (the Marriage Theorem). Given (W,M, T ), the following two conditions are
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equivalent:
1. there exists a perfect matching;
2. for every W ′ ⊆ W , |M(W ′)| ≥ |W ′|, and for every M ′ ⊆M , |W (M ′)| ≥ |M ′|.
Figure 7 provides an instance where a perfect matching exists, and another instance
where a perfect matching does not exist.
w1 w2 w3
m1 m2 m3
w1 w2 w3
m1 m2 m3
Figure 7: On the left, an example is drawn where a perfect matching exists. In the example
on the right, instead, no perfect matching exists; in fact, W ({m1,m3}) = {w2}, and hence
|W ({m1,m3})| = 1 < 2 = |{m1,m3}|.
6.1 Myopic team-wise stability and coalitional stability
We now endow agents with preferences over mates. In particular, we use u(m,w) to denote
the utility that man m earns if matched with woman w. Similarly, we use u(w,m) to
denote the utility that woman w earns if matched with woman m. Let u(m, ∅) and u(w, ∅)
indicate the utility of remaining unmatched for man m and woman w respectively. The set of
feasible pairs P is such that u(m,w) < u(m, ∅) or u(w,m) < u(w, ∅) imply that (m,w) /∈ P .
Therefore, Assumption v0 turns out to be satisfied. Apart from preferences, pairs can be
unfeasible for technological reasons (e.g., they cannot meet since they live too far away from
each other).
We observe that marriage is a specific instance of the general model presented in Section 2.
In this context there is only one activity: marriage. So there is a one-to-one correspondence
between teams and projects. Moreover, wi = 1 – i.e., each agent’s endowment is 1 – and
every t ∈ P is such that there exist i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, with ti = tj = 1 and tk = 0 for every
k 6= i, j – i.e, only pairs can be feasible teams. As an application of Lemma 1, we can state
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that the set of myopically team-wise stable states coincides with the set of matchings where
no additional pair can be formed, i.e., matchings x with F (X) = ∅.
In marriage problems, a standard notion of stability is employed. A collection of pairs
x ⊆ P is said to be a stable matching if for all (w,m) ∈ x, we have that if m′ is such that
(w,m′) ∈ P and u(w,m′) > u(w,m), then u(m′, w) > u(m′, w′) with (w′,m′) ∈ x. It has
been known since Gale and Shapley (1962) that a stable matching always exists in marriage
problems. It is also a known result that the set of stable matchings in a marriage problem
coincides with the core. Moreover, the notion of coalitional stability (see Section 5) becomes
equivalent to the core when each agent can belong to only one group. Therefore, we have
that CS 6= ∅. As we already know, we also have CS ⊆MTS.
We may wonder if coalitional stability maximizes the number of pairs that are formed.
In particular, the Marriage Theorem tells us under what conditions a perfect matching is
feasible; we may now hope that coalitional stability ensures that agents are actually able to
achieve a perfect matching in such cases. Example 8 shows that such hope is vain.
Example 8. Consider the left part of Figure 7. Assume the following preferences. For every
woman, men are ranked in this way: m1 is better than m2, who is better than m3. For
every man, women are ranked in this way: w3 is better than w2, who is better than w1. The
only stable matching is x = {(w2,m1), (w3,m2)}. We observe that a perfect matching exists:
x′ = {(w1,m1), (w2,m2), (w3,m3)}.
6.2 Stochastic stability
Following the discrete dynamic discussed in Section 4.1, suppose that xs is the actual match-
ing at time s. At every time-step a pair of agents (w,m) is randomly selected, and such
a pair is formed if and only if it can feasibly be formed given xs, i.e., (w,m) ∈ F (xs). As
an application of Proposition 2, in the resulting Markov chain there are no recurrent states
other than absorbing states, and a state x is absorbing if and only if F (x) = ∅.
We can then analyze the perturbed Markov chain where, at every time s, each existing
pair has an i.i.d. probability  of dissolving. This makes the dynamic system irreducible
and aperiodic, and allows us to apply the theory of regularly perturbed Markov chains. In
particular, we can use Proposition 3 to conclude that the stochastically stable states are
matchings where the number of pairs is maximized. This result can be put at work together
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with the Marriage Theorem to obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7. Given (W,M,P ), if for every W ′ ⊆ W , |M(W ′)| ≥ |W ′|, and for every
M ′ ⊆ M , |W (M ′)| ≥ |M ′|, then the set of perfect matchings is non-empty and coincides
with the set of stochastically stable states.
To illustrate an application of the definitions, we can consider the left-hand panel of
Figure 7 (Example 8), where we have that:
- the following matchings are myopically team-wise stable states: {(w1,m1), (w3,m2)},
{(w2,m1), (w3,m2)}, {(w2,m1), (w3,m3)}, {(w1,m1), (w3,m2)}, {(w1,m1), (w2,m2), (w3,m3)};
- the only matching that is a coalitionally stable state is: {(w2,m1), (w3,m2)};
- the only matching that is a stochastically stable state is: {(w1,m1), (w2,m2), (w3,m3)}.
In conclusion, even when a perfect matching is feasible, rational behavior may prevent
agents from achieving it. In contrast, myopic best-reply behavior coupled with tiny pertur-
bations is capable of maintaining the system almost always with no uncoupled agent. This
kind of result can be of particular interest in a firm/worker interpretation, in particular where
preferences are not strong on either side, as could be the case in a market for non-skilled
workers with homogeneous wages.17 Moreover, our general framework of Section 2 allows us
to easily manage extensions where firms can hire multiple workers, or the same workers can
perform more than one job simultaneously.
7 Conclusions and future research
In this paper we have provided a model which describes how teams of individuals arise in
order to perform activities, investing amounts of a scarce resource (typically time) to conduct
the activities. The kinds of interaction that can be modeled in the proposed framework are
many and widespread in economic and social spheres. Unfortunately, in a context like this
the complexity of analysis can increase very rapidly, so that predictions become very hard
to make. Nevertheless, we introduce and discuss alternative notions of stability – myopic
17The latter assumption on preferences helps to consider stochastic stability as a more prominent concept
than coalitional stability, decreasing the benefits of exiting from a project to form a new one. Alternatively,
a variant of the model with switching costs can be considered, along the lines of Appendix A.
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team-wise stability, stochastic stability and coalitional stability – and we are able to provide
results that are rather clear-cut (especially for stochastic stability).
Future work can highlight the relevance of the model for specific applications. The
setting that we have provided is sufficiently general and flexible to accommodate many
different sets of assumptions, and this allows a proper fine-tuning of the model. The examples
throughout the paper illustrate its applicative potential. In Appendix A, a variant of the
model is presented where we add switching costs, which can be considered as a realistic
feature for several applications. A promising direction for research could explore its potential
applicability to the job market, where the result that stochastic stability selects states with
the highest number of projects has an interesting interpretation in terms of unemployment
reduction.
On a purely theoretical ground, we provide here below three possible lines along which
research may lead to interesting advancements.
The first question is related to the concept of coalitional stability that we define in Section
5. We are able to provide examples of non-existence of coalitionally stable states, but also
(as in Proposition 5) to prove their existence under specific assumptions. We partly address
this question in Appendix B, where we define a wider set of farsightedly stable states, whose
existence is always granted. However, we conjecture that the existence of simple coalitionally
stable states holds also for more general assumptions than those of Proposition 5.
The second question is related to welfare issues, and follows from the discussion in Sections
4 and 5: under which conditions on the utility function are SS states and CS states Pareto
efficient, or do they maximize the objective function of some social planner? Clearly a simple
case is the one in which the objective function is monotonic in the number of teams, so that
SS states are optimal ; or the case in which the utility function is monotonic for all agents in
the objective function, so that CS states would be optimal, because even the grand coalition
made of all the N agents is better off in those states. But how much of the two simple
statements above can be generalized in order to have non-trivial results?
The third question follows from the previous one but has a mechanism design approach.
Suppose that, through incentives, a planner can slightly change the utility function, not to
obtain the trivial forms discussed above but something approaching that. Alternatively, the
planner could have the possibility of modifying the technology, at least to the point at which
feasibility depends on the structure of connections among agents: only agents that are close
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(in some sense) can work together, and the planner can adopt policies to affect who is close
to whom. What are the sufficient conditions that would allow the planner to make SS or
CS states Pareto efficient, or make them approach maxima of some objective function?
Acknowledgements
We thank the following for helpful comments: Andrea Galeotti, Sanjev Goyal, Matthew
Jackson, Shachar Kariv, Brian Rogers, Fernando Vega Redondo, Simon Weidenholzer, Leeat
Yariv and seminar participants at the ASSET 2012 Meeting in Cyprus, Berkeley, Caltech,
Essex University, European University Institute, LUISS University in Rome, University of
Siena and Stanford University.
References
Andonov, R., V. Poirriez, and S. Rajopadhye (2000). Unbounded knapsack problem: Dy-
namic programming revisited. European Journal of Operational Research 123 (2), 394 –
407.
Becker, G. S. (1973). A theory of marriage: Part i. Journal of Political Economy 81, 813–846.
Boncinelli, L. and P. Pin (2012). “Stochastic Stability in the Best Shot Network Game”.
Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2), 583–554.
Bose, R. C. and B. Manvel (1984). Introduction to Combinatorial Theory. New York: Wiley.
Breschi, S. and F. Lissoni (2001). “Knowledge Spillovers and Local Innovation Systems: A
Critical Survey”. Industrial and corporate change 10 (4), 975–1005.
Cabot, A. (1970). “An Enumeration Algorithm for Knapsack Problems”. Operations Re-
search 18, 306–311.
Coviello, D., A. Ichino, and N. Persico (2013). Time allocation and task juggling. American
Economic Review . forthcoming.
Currarini, S., M. Jackson, and P. Pin (2009). “An Economic Model of Friendship: Ho-
mophily, Minorities and Segregation”. Econometrica 77 (4), 1003–1045.
36
Currarini, S. and F. Vega-Redondo (2010). “Homophily and Search”. Mimeo.
Dutta, B., S. Ghosal, and D. Ray (2005). Farsighted network formation. Journal of Economic
Theory 122 (2), 143–164.
Ellison, G. (2000). “Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of
Step-by-Step Evolution”. The Review of Economic Studies 67, 17–45.
Erdo¨s, P. and A. Re´nyi (1960). On the evolution of random graphs. Publ. Math. Inst.
Hungar. Acad. Sci 5, 17–61.
Faias, M. and J. Luque (2012). “Endogenous Bourse Structures”. Mimeo.
Foster, D. and H. P. Young (1990). “Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics”. Theoretical
Population Biology 38, 219–232.
Franz, S., M. Marsili, and P. Pin (2010). “Observed Choices and Underlying Opportunities”.
Science and Culture 76, 471–476.
Fuchs, W. and L. Garicano (2012). “Professional Service Outsourcing, Asymmetric Infor-
mation and Wage Inequality”. Mimeo.
Gale, D. and L. Shapley (1962). “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”. Amer-
ican Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.
Gillies, D. (1959). “Solutions to General Non–Zero–Sum Games”. In A. Tucker and R. Luce
(Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games, Vol. 4. Princeton University Press.
Gomes, A. and P. Jehiel (2005). Dynamic processes of social and economic interactions: On
the persistence of inefficiencies. Journal of Political Economy 113 (3), 626–667.
Goyal, S. and S. Joshi (2003). Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly. Games and Economic
Behavior 43 (1), 57 – 85.
Goyal, S. and F. Vega-Redondo (2007). “Structural Holes in Social Networks”. Journal of
Economic Theory 137, 460–492.
Hall, P. (1935). On representatives of subsets. J. London Math. Soc 10 (1), 26–30.
37
Hatfield, J., F. Kojima, and Y. Narita (2012). “Many-to-Many Matching with Max–Min
Preferences”. Mimeo.
Herings, P.-J., A. Mauleon, and V. Vannetelbosch (2009). “Farsightedly Stable Networks”.
Games and Economic Behavior 67, 526–541.
Herings, P.-J., A. Mauleon, and V. Vannetelbosch (2010). “Coalition Formation among
Farsighted Agents”. Games 1 (3), 286–298.
Hyndman, K. and D. Ray (2007). Coalition formation with binding agreements. The Review
of Economic Studies 74 (4), 1125–1147.
Jackson, M. (2005). “A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency”.
In G. Demange and M. Wooders (Eds.), Group Formation in Economics; Networks, Clubs
and Coalitions. Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, M. and A. Watts (2002). “The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks”.
Journal of Economic Theory 106 (2), 265–296.
Jackson, M. and A. Wolinsky (1996). “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks”.
Journal of Economic Theory 71, 44–74.
Jackson, M. O. and A. Van den Nouweland (2005). Strongly stable networks. Games and
Economic Behavior 51 (2), 420–444.
Kandori, M., G. J. Mailath, and R. Rob (1993). “Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equi-
libria in Games”. Econometrica 61, 29–56.
Klaus, B., F. Klijn, and M. Walzl (2010). “Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets”.
Journal of Economic Theory 145 (6), 2218 – 2240.
Konishi, H. and D. Ray (2003). Coalition formation as a dynamic process. Journal of
Economic Theory 110 (1), 1–41.
Majumder, A., S. Datta, and K. Naidu (2012). Capacitated team formation problem on
social networks. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM SIGKDD international conference on
knowledge discovery and data mining, pp. 1005–1013. ACM.
38
Mantovani, M., G. Kirchsteiger, A. Mauleon, and V. Vannetelbosch (2011). “Myopic or
Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation”. Mimeo.
Molloy, M. and B. Reed (1995). A critical point for random graphs with a given degree
sequence. Random structures & algorithms 6 (2-3), 161–180.
Navarro, N. (2013). Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation. Social Choice
and Welfare, 1–22.
Page, F., M. Wooders, and S. Kamat (2005). “Networks and Farsighted Stability”. Journal
of Economic Theory 120 (2), 257–269.
Pauly, M. (1970). “Cores and Clubs”. Public Choice 9 (1), 53–65.
Pycia, M. (2012). “Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Forma-
tion”. Econometrica 80 (1), 323–362.
Roth, A. E. and J. H. V. Vate (1990). Random paths to stability in two-sided matching.
Econometrica 58 (6), 1475–1480.
Staudigl, M. and S. Weidenholzer (2012). “Constrained Interaction and Social Coordina-
tion”. Mimeo.
Stuart, T. and O. Sorenson (2008). “Strategic Networks and Entrepreneurial Ventures”.
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 1, 211–227.
Vega-Redondo, F. (2007). Complex Social Networks. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge
University Press.
Young, H. P. (1993). “The Evolution of Conventions”. Econometrica 61, 57–84.
Young, H. P. (1998). Individual Strategy and Social Structure. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
39
Appendix A Robustness of stochastic stability with re-
spect to switching costs
[FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION]
In this appendix we endow agents with the same degree of rationality and coordinating
abilities that we have used in Section 5 for coalitional stability. However, we introduce
switching costs to exit from existing projects, showing that if such costs are sufficiently high
then coalitional stability coincides with myopic team-wise stability. Moreover, we consider
an unperturbed dynamics based on coalitional stability, and we reproduce the results of
Proposition 2. Finally, we show that the introduction of uniform perturbations like in Section
4 yields the same predictions as Proposition 3, i.e., stochastically stable states are maximal
states.
The following definition provides an adjusted notion of coalitional stability.
Definition A. A state x is coalitionally stable [CS] (or coalition proof) if there exists no
subset C ⊆ N such that
(i) there exists a set of projects y ⊆ x such that ∀ p ∈ y, ∃ i ∈ C such that i ∈ n(p);
(ii) there exists a set of projects z such that z∩x = ∅ and, ∀ p ∈ z, if j ∈ n(p) then j ∈ C;
(iii) (x\y)∪ z ∈ X and for any agent i ∈ C we have that ui((x \ y)∪ z)− c
∑
p∈y 1i(n(p)) >
ui(x).
The only difference with respect to the definition provided in Section 5 concerns point
(iii), in particular the presence of switching costs that affect the advantage of exiting from
projects and forming new ones. More precisely, each agent is aware that she will pay a cost
equal to c ≥ 0 for each project she wants to leave. Function 1i(n(p)) denotes the indicator
function, giving 1 if agent i belongs to project p, and 0 otherwise. We denote by CS(c) the
set of coalitionally stable states when switching costs are equal to c.
For ease of presentation of our argument, we define a blocking operation as a quintuple
(x,C, y, z, c) such that for every member i of coalition C we have that ui((x \ y) ∪ z) −
c
∑
p∈y 1i(n(p)) > ui(x). We denote by BO(c) the set containing all blocking operations
when switching costs are c.
The following proposition shows a kind of continuity of coalitional stability with respect
to c. In the presence of a tiny amount of switching costs, the predictions given by coalitional
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stability do not change compared to the case without switching costs. By contrast, when
c is large enough, then coalitional stability gives the same predictions as myopic team-wise
stability. In the proposition we use MTS and CS as defined in Sections 3 and 5.
Proposition A. Take a team formation model satisfying Assumption v0. Then:
(i) if c is low enough, then CS(c) = CS;
(ii) if c is high enough, then CS(c) = MTS.
Proof. Preliminarily, we provide the following thresholds for switching costs:
c = min
(x,C,y,z,0)∈BO(0)
min
i∈C
ui((x \ y) ∪ z)− ui(x)
c = max
(x,C,y,z,0)∈BO(0)
min
i∈C
ui((x \ y) ∪ z)− ui(x)
We observe that c and c are well-defined, since a maximum and a minimum always exist in
finite sets, and N , X and P are all finite.
To prove point (i), we show the double implication. We start from CS ⊆ CS(c) for every
c ≥ 0. Take a state x ∈ CS. We know that no blocking coalition exists in the absence of
switching costs, and no blocking coalition can arise when switching costs are added, since the
advantage for a coalition to exit from projects and form new ones cannot increase. Hence,
x ∈ CS(c) for every c ≥ 0.
We now show that CS ⊆ CS(c) if c is sufficiently low. We fix c < c and we consider
a state x ∈ CS(c). For such a state no blocking operation exists when switching costs are
c. Suppose ad absurdum that a blocking operation exists in the absence of switching costs,
i.e, there exists (x,C, y, z, 0) ∈ BO(0). This means that there must exist i ∈ C such that
ui((x \ y)∪ z) > ui(x) and ui((x \ y)c
∑
p∈y 1i(n(p))∪ z) > ui(x), but this is in contradiction
with c < c. Hence, x ∈ CS if c < c.
To prove point (ii), we exploit Lemma 1, and we show the double implication between
CS(c) and M. Clearly, CS(c) ⊆ M for every c ≥ 0. By contraposition, if x /∈ M, then
there exists a project p ∈ P such that p /∈ x and x ∪ {p} ∈ X. Due to Assumption v0,
(x, n(p), ∅, {p}, 0) ∈ BO(0), and hence x /∈ CS.
Finally, we show that M ⊆ CS(c) if c is sufficiently high. We fix c ≥ c. Then, no
blocking operation exists such that y 6= ∅. By contraposition, if x /∈ CS(c), then there exists
a blocking operation (x,C, ∅, z, 0). This means that x ∪ z ∈ X, and hence x /∈M.
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As a corollary of Proposition A, we observe that the set of coalitionally stable states is
always non-empty if switching costs are sufficiently high.
We now introduce an adjusted unperturbed dynamics which is based on coalitional sta-
bility, and we refer to it as coalition-wise dynamics. Basically, everything is as in the myopic
team-wise dynamics used in Section 4, with the following difference. At each time two sets
of projects, y and z, are randomly selected from the set of all subsets of P .18 The state of
the system changes from the current state x to (x \ y) ∪ z if there exists a coalition C that
has the power to destroy all projects in y and to form all projects in z, and has advantage
in doing so, i.e., each of its members strictly increases her utility if she behaves in such a
manner. Clearly, this coalition is exactly of the type which is excluded by the definition of
coalitional stability.
In the coalition-wise dynamics, we denote by R(c) and A(c), respectively, the set of
recurrent states and the set of absorbing states when the level of switching costs is c. A
characterization analogous to that in Proposition 2 can be provided for the current setup.
Proposition B. Take a team formation model satisfying Assumption v0 and a coalition-
wise dynamics. If c is high enough, then A(c) = R(c) =M = MTS.
Proof. We fix c ≥ c. We already know by definition that A(c) ⊆ R(c).
Suppose now that x /∈ M. Then, there exists a project p ∈ P such that x ∪ {p} ∈ X.
Such a project can be selected in the coalition-wise dynamics and, given Assumption v0, it
will be formed by agents belonging to n(p). Since no project will ever cease to exist, due to
c ≥ c, we can conclude that x /∈ R(c). Hence, R(c) ⊆M.
Moreover, M⊆ A, since by starting from a state x ∈ M no new project can be formed
and existing projects are too costly to be destroyed.
Finally, we observe that M = MTS by Lemma 1.
To provide results on stochastic stability, we have to introduce a perturbed dynamics. In
particular, we can adopt each of the two perturbation schemes of Section 4. More precisely,
in the uniform perturbation scheme, at every time s each project p ∈ P is hit by an error
with an i.i.d. probability : if p is an existing project then it disappears, while if p is a
non-existing project than it is formed unless xs ∪ {p} /∈ X. In the uniform destructive
18The details of this probabilistic selection are not important for the results as long as every pair y, z is
chosen with positive probability.
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perturbation scheme, on the other hand, only existing projects can be hit by perturbations.
In the coalition-wise dynamics with uniform (destructive) perturbation scheme, we denote
by SS(c) the set of stochastically stable states.
Proposition C. Take a team formation model satisfying Assumption v0, a coalition-wise
dynamics and a uniform perturbation scheme. If c is high enough, then SS(c) = L.
Proof. We fix c ≥ c. By Propositions 1 and B, we know that the set of absorbing states is
the same as in the model of Section 4.
We now consider resistances. Since switching costs are so high that no agent will ever
exit from an existing project, we have that a perturbation is required for every project to be
destroyed. New projects will instead be formed in the unperturbed dynamics, since they are
certainly advantageous due to Assumption v0. Therefore, r∗(x, x′) = `(x)−`(x∩x′). Hence,
even the resistances between absorbing states are the same as in the model of Section 4.
Having the same set of absorbing states and the same resistances between them, we can
invoke Proposition 3 to conclude that SS(c) = L.
Appendix B Farsightedly stable sets of states
[FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION]
The set of coalitionally stable states, as defined in Section 5, may be empty. In this appendix
we apply results from Herings et al. (2009, 2010) to show that it is possible, on the other
hand, to define a wider set of farsightedly stable states, whose existence is always granted.
The two papers are applied respectively to network formation games and cooperative games,
and as our setup generalizes both, the two papers also offer the possibility of finding examples
of the non-existence of CS states for our model.
First of all we need to define improving paths, with a simple rephrasing of Definition 2.
Definition B (Improving paths). Given a state x there is an improving path from x to
another state x′ if there exists a subset C ⊆ N such that
(i) there exists a set of projects y ⊆ x such that ∀ p ∈ y, ∃ i ∈ C such that i ∈ n(p);
(ii) there exists a set of projects z such that z∩x = ∅ and, ∀ p ∈ z, if j ∈ n(p) then j ∈ C;
(iii) x′ = (x\y) ∪ z ∈ X and for any agent i ∈ C we have that ui(x′) > ui(x).
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Definition B generalizes farsighted improving paths from Definition 3 in Herings et al.
(2009) and Definition 1 in Herings et al. (2010). For a state x we can define as F (x) the
set of all the states x′ that can be reached from x along improving paths, and as Cx→x′ the
coalition that is profitably moving from state x to state x′. It is clear that a state x is CS if
and only if F (x) = ∅.
Now, the improving path promoted by a coalition is moving on the partially ordered set
X of all possible states to a new state. What if another coalition were to start a new path
from this new state? This could harm the members of the original coalition, who would
not have been farsighted enough. To increase the rationality of the agents the following
definition is used.
Definition C (Farsightedly stable sets of states). A set of states S ⊆ X is farsightedly
stable if:
(i) for any x ∈ S, x′ 6∈ S, such that x′ ∈ F (x), there is an x′′ ∈ F (x′) such that there is
an agent i ∈ Cx→x′, for which ui(x′′) < ui(x);
(ii) for any x′ ∈ X\S, F (x′) ∩ S 6= ∅;
(iii) there is no S ′ ( S such that S ′ satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) above.
Definition C generalizes farsightedly stable sets from Definition 4 in Herings et al. (2009)
and Definition 4 in Herings et al. (2010). Condition (i) says that if there is an improving
path from a state x belonging to S, to another state x′ outside it, then this is due to the
fact that the improving path in question could possibly harm one of the members of the
coalition in Cx→x′ , because of a new improving path, promoted by another coalition, from
x′. Condition (ii) says that from every state outside X there is an improving path into
X. Finally, since the previous two conditions are trivially satisfied by X itself, condition
(iii) says that a set of states S is farsightedly stable if no proper subset of states of S
is also farsightedly stable. A farsightedly stable set S of states always exists, and this is
proven by the following proposition, which generalizes Theorem 2 in Herings et al. (2009)
and Proposition 1 in Herings et al. (2010).
Proposition D (Existence of a farsightedly stable sets of states). For every team formation
model characterized by a quintuple (N,w, P,X,u), there exists a farsightedly stable sets of
states S ⊆ X.
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Proof. We proceed by contradiction. The set X of states, whose cardinality is given by
a finite natural number ω0, satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition C. Therefore, X
may not be farsightedly stable because it does not satisfy condition (iii), i.e., there is a set
X1 ( X, whose cardinality is given by some finite natural number ω1 < ω0, which also
satisfies those two conditions. If X1 does also not satisfy condition (iii), we can iterate the
reasoning. If we never find a set that satisfies all conditions from Definition C, it means that
we have found an infinite series {ωi}i∈N such that ωi+1 < ωi for every i ∈ N. Such an infinite
series is impossible, and this proves the statement.
Appendix C Combinatorics for the connection model
with heterogeneous skills
[FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION]
In this appendix we prove formally some results previewed in Example 6, where we introduced
the network corresponding to ` overlapping matchings between n agents. First, we obtain
that if the overlapping networks are randomly generated with uniform and independent
probabilities, then, for any ` ≥ 3, as n → ∞, the resulting network will almost surely be
connected. This result is based on Molloy and Reed (1995), which generalizes Erdo¨s and
Re´nyi (1960) (see Chapter 2 of Vega-Redondo, 2007 for a less technical presentation of this
approach).
Proposition E. Consider ` independent and uniformly random matchings between n ≥ `
agents, and the resulting network where two agents i and j are connected if and only if they
are matched in at least one of those matchings. For any ` ≥ 3, the probability that the
resulting network is connected goes to 1 as n→∞.
Proof. Call p(k) the probability that an agent i (note that the agents are ex-ante identical)
has degree k in the network. We have that
p(`) =
(n− 1)(n− 2) . . . (n− `)
(n− 1)` , (a)
where, above, we have the number of all the ` matchings that do not repeat the identity of
the agents i is matched to, and, below, all possible matchings between i and the other n− 1
agents.
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Theorem 1 in Molloy and Reed (1995) proves that if the following strict inequality holds
lim
n→∞
n−1∑
k=1
k(k − 2)p(k) > 0, (b)
then the network is almost surely connected as n grows to infinity.
As n →∞, it follows from (a) that p(`) → 1. Then ∑n−1k=1 k(k − 2)p(k) → `(`− 2), and
this latter quantity is strictly positive for any ` ≥ 3.
Even if formally correct, the above result is asymptotic, while the intuition for, and the
formal definition of, stochastic stability are based on a finite set of states. For this reason,
we consider finite ` and n, and the ratio of the resulting networks that are not connected, on
all the possible resulting networks. We give the proof here below, finding an upper bound
for this ratio, and finding that, even for limited values of ` ≥ 3 and n, this ratio is bounded
above by very low values.
Proposition F. Consider ` independent and uniformly random matchings between n =
2m ≥ ` agents, and the resulting network where two agents i and j are connected if and only
if they are matched in at least one of those matchings. Among all the possible matchings,
the ratio of those that result in a corresponding disconnected network is bounded above by the
quantity
m−1∑
k=1
(
m
k
)`(
2m
2k
)`−1 , (c)
where
(
h
j
)
= h!
j!(h−j)! is the standard notation for all the possible ways to extract j elements
from a set of cardinality h.
Proof. Consider all the possible matchings between 2m agents, without partition as in a
single roommate matching, with m ∈ N+. Call N(m) the number of all those matchings.
The combinatorial problem is equivalent to choosing, without replacement, two agents among
the first 2m, then two more among the remaining 2m− 2, and so on. In formulas we have
N(m) =
1
m!
(
2m
2
)(
2m− 2
2
)
. . .
(
2
2
)
=
(2m)!
m! 2m
,
where the first term 1
m!
divides by all possible permutations among the matchings.
Consider now ` separate matchings between the same 2m agents. Their number is N(m)`.
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We study the corresponding network, where a node between two agents is present if they are
matched in at least one of the matchings. The number of ways in which ` distinct matchings
result in a disconnected network is certainly bounded above by the following formula:
# disconnected ≤
m−1∑
k=1
(
2m
2k
)
(N(k))`(N(m− k))`, (d)
where the term
(
2m
2k
)
considers all possible ways to make a partition of the 2m agents into
two nonempty subsets, after which we consider all the possible matchings between them in
the ` matchings. This number is an upper bound because there are disconnected resulting
networks, with more than two components, that are counted several times.19 20 Finally,
expressing the terms we have
# disconnected
# all
≤
m−1∑
k=1
(
2m
2k
)
(N(k))`(N(m− k))`
N(m)`
=
m−1∑
k=1
(m!)` 2m` (2k!)`−1 ((2m− 2k)!)`−1
(2m!)`−1 (k!)` 2k` ((m− k)!)` 2(m−k)` ,
and simplifying, the last expression is equivalent to (c).
The term in (c) may be difficult to interpret, but Table 1 shows that it approaches very
small quantities even for limited values of n and `.21
19As an example, if m = 4, consider the case in which all the matchings overlap and the resulting network
is made up of 4 disconnected pairs of nodes. This case is counted both when we consider two components of
2 and 6 elements respectively, and also when we consider two components of 4 elements each.
20There is also another reason why the right-hand part of inequality (d) is an upper bound for the left hand
part: when the size of the two subsets of agents are asymmetric (e.g. 2 and 6) all the possible disconnected
networks are counted in the reverse order as well (6 and 2). Therefore, the right-hand part is almost twice as
extensive as the left-hand part. We do not consider this in the proof in order to avoid a distinction between
even and odd m.
21It is clear that the result of Proposition F could be used to prove Proposition E, because the limit of
(c), for n→∞, is 0. However, we find the present proof for Proposition E more direct and elegant.
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Table 1: Computation of expression (c), for varying ` and n = 2m.
n=10 20 30 40 50 100
`= 3 0.16881 0.067102 0.039556 0.028198 0.021957 0.010454
4 0.015877 0.002998 0.001242 0.000678 0.000426 0.000103
5 0.001627 0.000154 4.25 ·10−5 1.73 ·10−5 8.68 ·10−6 1.04 ·10−6
6 0.000174 8.08 ·10−6 1.46 ·10−6 4.43 ·10−7 1.77 ·10−7 1.05 ·10−8
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